Dump A List Of All SchemaIDGUIDs With Powershell __LINK__

Dump A List Of All SchemaIDGUIDs With Powershell __LINK__

Download File - https://shoxet.com/2t7KjS

By default, when a principal with the AD permission Read ms-Mcs-AdmPwd reads the attribute ms-Mcs-AdmPwd there is no log entry made on the Domain Controller. Therefore, a compromised account could dump all LAPS set passwords from AD undetected.

This post is written assuming that we have already read the installation instructions for LAPS. The list does not have to be done sequentially. Although this post is written with Server deployments in mind, the same considerations apply to Workstation deployments.

In this scenario we need list all members of the local Administrators groups on all servers and verify that the admin account is present. This can be done remotely using Powershell. Jeffery Hicks has written a script that can do this: -local-group-members-with-powershell/

There was in interesting discussion the other day on the ActiveDir.org mailing list. Someone asked how many values can be stored within the proxyAddresses mutlivalued attribute in Active Directory. The responses were reasonably consistent, with most people indicating that in Windows 2000 the number was in the range of approximately 800 to 850 and from Windows 2000 the range is approximately 1200 to 1300.

This finally results in a neatly formatted table with list of users having any non-inherited i.e. delegated rights on specific objects. By Default, the delegated rights cascade down the OU tree so if top level OU has the rights, it would automatically cascade down to the next OU section unless and until explicitly removed.

Exception calling "SetAccessRule" with "1" argument(s): "This access control list is not in canonical form and therefore cannot be modified." At line:8 char:1 + $aclOU.SetAccessRule($AccessRule) + ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + CategoryInfo : NotSpecified: (:) [], MethodInvocationException + FullyQualifiedErrorId : InvalidOperationException

Here we can see the certificate requested during the Register-AzureADPasswordProtectForest cmdlet had the private key merged back into the certificate, then it was serialized to JSON, encoded in UTF8, encrypted, base64 encoded, and written to the directory to the msDS-Settings attribute. That jives with what we observed earlier in that dumping that attribute and base-64 decoding it gave us nothing decipherable.

Navigating into the blade shows an entirely new interface with far more useful information. We now have a complete list of the roles AAD PIM can manage including descriptions. If we select a role we go a level deeper and can add users to the role as we would expect.

One of the metrics that caught my eye was the single user in the User Access Administrator role. Selecting that area of the dashboard opens a new blade which lists out the members of the role. We can see the service principal for PIM has been added to the User Access Administrator role to grant the service permissions to administer the roles within the resource (in this case a subscription). 2b1af7f3a8